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discussion. For example, it notes that 1) policymakers should monitor 
multiple targets, not just the inflation rate, and 2) they should use 
multiple instruments, including fiscal policies and exchange-rate 
policies as well as monetary policies. This sounds like it could be an 
opening to greater policy flexibility. However, the Note is quick to set 
restrictive boundaries on any reform agenda.
While re-asserting the Fund’s pre-crisis macroeconomic position that 
“the ultimate goals should be to achieve a stable output gap and 
stable inflation” (italics added, p. 16), the IMF Note acknowledges that 
output stability should be accorded more importance than previously 
was the case. But, in the current context, this stance serves mainly to 
reaffirm the Fund’s fundamental assumption that macroeconomic 
policies are suited to deal only with short-term stability issues. 
This conventional view assumes that if macroeconomic stability 
is ensured, then private-sector led growth and development will 
surely follow. The paper published by Eurodad and the Third World 
Network takes, in contrast, a more development-oriented view of 
macroeconomic policies, emphasising, for instance, the use of public 
investment and directed credit allocations to stimulate economic 
growth and human development. But in this Development Viewpoint, 
we have space only to focus on the IMF views.
More Targets and Instruments
What does the IMF Note mean when it recommends adopting more 
‘targets and instruments’? Promisingly, it does question why, prior 
to the crisis, central banks had been encouraged to adopt as their 
“primary, if not exclusive, mandate” achieving “stable and low inflation” 
(p. 3), and to target, in particular, a very low inflation rate of 2%.
The Note offers a significant concession that “the behaviour of 
inflation is much more complex than is assumed in our simple models 
and that we understand the relationship between activity and 
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IMF public-relations offensives before the joint IMF-World Bank 
Spring Meetings are not uncommon. But in the wake of the recent 
chastening impact of the Great Recession, this year’s Spring campaign 
has heightened expectations of real macroeconomic concessions. 
After all, the IMF cannot argue that tight financial restrictions are 
preventing it from offering more flexible conditions. The G-20 Summit 
in April 2009 pledged to treble the IMF’s lending resources to a level 
of US$ 750 billion. As a result, the Fund is now disbursing dramatically 
enhanced levels of credit to client countries since 2006-07 (see Chart). 
In light of these factors, should we realistically expect the IMF to 
abandon some of its guiding Neoliberal tenets? Early signs are not, to 
say the least, encouraging. This is the conclusion of a newly released 
Eurodad and Third World Network report, “Standing in the Way of 
Development? A Critical Survey of the IMF’s Crisis Response in Low 
Income Countries” (Van Waeyenberge, Bargawi and McKinley 2010). 
This report comments that the title of a bell-weather February 2010 
IMF Staff Position Note, ‘Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy’, by Chief 
Economist Olivier Blanchard and co-authors Giovanni Dell’Ariccia 
and Paolo Mauro appears to promise significant reform. Seemingly 
taking a self-critical view of conventional assumptions about its 
macroeconomic policies prior to the Great Recession, the IMF Note 
announces on the first page that it seeks to identify “the contours of a 
new macroeconomic policy framework”. 
In the end, however, there appears to be an acutely insufficient supply 
of real rethinking relative to the recent upsurge of aggregate demand 
for such reform. The Note basically defends the essentials of the pre-
crisis IMF framework. As it states on the last page, “in many ways, the 
general policy framework should remain the same”. 
But it does appear to open up a few channels for potentially fruitful 
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inflation quite poorly” (p. 7). Nevertheless, the authors of the Staff Note 
focus mainly on the deflationary danger of a Keynesian ‘liquidity trap’ 
brought on by a severe recession (such as the current one).
Under such a condition, the central bank would be powerless to push 
the policy interest rate below the obvious 0% nominal limit even 
though it urgently needed to expand economy-wide liquidity in order 
to forestall an impending depression. Having been shaken by the 
prospect of such a trap during this Great Recession and wishing to 
avoid it in the future, the authors of the IMF Note recommend that the 
general inflation target should be raised to 4% to give room for more 
downward adjustment. 
So, in the end, it appears that low-inflation targets remain an IMF 
policy priority. The Note does not even contemplate that inflation 
in the higher single digits, or even between 10% and 15%, could be 
compatible with output stability and growth. In fact, it is difficult to 
understand how such a target would apply to developing countries, 
where domestic and external supply shocks—not necessarily policy 
excesses—often produce levels of inflation higher than 5%.
The IMF authors do claim to question the adoption of only one 
instrument for monetary policy, namely, the policy interest rate. This 
is the short-term rate over which the central bank can, it is assumed, 
exercise some influence through open-market operations. However, 
there is a very shallow market for domestically issued bonds in 
most low-income countries. So, marketing bonds usually confronts 
persistently high real rates of interest for either public or private 
borrowing.
The authors purport to recognise that central banks must also take 
account of the impact of exchange-rate policies on inflation. And 
they claim to favour supplementing standard monetary policies with 
such exchange-rate policies as “reserve accumulation and sterilized 
intervention”. 
But it is difficult to determine how such a new stance fits with the IMF’s 
long-standing advocacy of fully flexible, ‘market-determined’ exchange 
rates. In fact, countries that have managed their exchange-rate (such 
as China) still seem to be suspected of mercantilist ‘manipulation’ of 
their currency’s relative value for their own unfair export advantage.
Re-evaluation of Fiscal Policies
The IMF Staff Note appears to open up the possibility of according 
fiscal policies a greater role in macroeconomic management. However, 
after having recalled that active fiscal policies became the main 
Keynesian macroeconomic tool in the wake of the Great Depression 
and that fiscal and monetary policies were later given “roughly equal 
billing” during the 1960s and 1970s, the IMF authors proceed to justify 
why, for various reasons, fiscal policies have had to take a backseat to 
monetary policies in the last two decades. 
Revealing a closely held secret, the authors claim that Keynesian 
discretionary fiscal policies have remained valid, all along, for 
combating “severe shocks”—such as the current Great Recession. 
But they still insist on confining fiscal policies to this limited, time-
bound counter-cyclical function—as well as (in symmetrical fashion) 
prudently restraining expenditures (namely, building up budget 
surpluses) during booms. 
Revealing their fundamental lack of faith in national fiscal authorities, 
the authors hasten to place tight limits on any discretion for fiscal 
policy. In response to the impact of the Great Recession on developing 
countries, for example, the authors prefer relying on the operation of 
‘automatic stabilizers’, such as progressive taxes or social insurance 
programs. 
However, as other IMF Staff Notes (e.g., Berg et al. 2009) have 
readily acknowledged, such stabilisers as social insurance—whose 
expenditures would rise automatically during recessions—are virtually 
non-existent in low-income countries. Hence, providing additional 
stimulus through a Keynesian-inspired widening of fiscal deficits 
would most likely have to rely on significant declines in revenue. This is 
a strange approach, indeed, to endorsing a stimulus package in poorer 
countries—without pro-actively boosting expenditures.
Such an approach would end up proposing fiscal stimulus a) only at 
a lower point in a deepening recession, b) only indirectly through 
assuming, heroically, that rising private expenditures would soon 
compensate for lower public revenue, and c) only by weakening, in the 
process, long-term state capacity for revenue mobilisation.
Concluding Remarks
Hence, despite having recently raised expectations about reforms 
in its fundamental policy stance, the IMF remains a long way 
from jettisoning the neoliberal underpinnings of its governing 
macroeconomic framework. 
If the Blanchard et al. Staff Note is any guide, there are likely to be very 
few changes indeed in its standard recommendations to developing 
countries on monetary and fiscal policies. The IMF’s monetary policies 
remain wedded, it appears, to strict targeting of a very low inflation 
rate (apparently only two percentage points higher than before); and 
its fiscal policies remain restricted to ineffectual, or even non-existent, 
automatic stabilisers. 
On either front, there is virtually no room for national policymakers 
to exercise any real discretion. Thus, the IMF is engaging in only a 
rhetorical opening up, at best, of any ‘policy space’ for developing-
country governments to determine their own macroeconomic 
framework.
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